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Abstract
Background: Since 2008, China has provided ITC (investment tax credit) and TID
(taxable income deduction) for firms who engage in investment or business related
to reducing pollution emissions and saving energy. This paper examines both
incidence and effects of these tax incentives.
Methods: We use a unique panel dataset mainly from the NTSD (the National Tax
Statistics Dataset of China) over 2007–2011, and utilize the Probit Model and the
specification suggested by Greenstone (2002) to identify incidence and effects of the
ITC and TID, respectively.
Results: We find that: (1) The two tax incentives are generally not popular. SOEs are
the main beneficiaries, while regional characteristics have no impact on taxpayers’
attitude to ITC or TID. The mechanism behind may be that the incentives hurt
interests of firms and local governments. (2) Their effects on taxpayers’ activities
including capital, employment, and production are not remarkable, while growth of
coal consumption significantly speeds up. These findings are robust to multiple
specifications of using different empirical strategies, samples, and variables. (3)
However, the results indicate that the tax incentives do serve the purpose of
protecting environment by restraining coal consumption in some specific group of
firms who are affiliated to the central government. This finding confirms a simple
model established in the paper that emphasizes the importance of the government’
executive power on tax policies and relates to the literature finding that local
support can remarkably boost the efficiency of tax incentives for environmental
protection.
Conclusions: According to the above findings, we conclude that the tax incentives
such as ITC or TID can be effective tools to protect China's environment if
correctively designed and adequately implemented.
Keywords: Tax incentives, Environmental protection, China
JEL Classification: H23, Q58, H30
Introduction
Tax policy is usually more efficient or less distorted than direct regulation, for the
former retains individuals’ rights to choose utility-maximizing or cost-minimizing solutions
(Tresch 2015, page 129). To achieve certain goals of environmental protection, many
countries have used various tax policies. Besides Pigovian taxes, others such as tax
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credits for specific investment on projects of limiting emissions have been widely
implemented. Empirical studies on effects of these policies, however, are far from
reaching consensus (see, e.g., Metcalf 2010; Murray et al. 2014; Roach 2015). This
paper investigates incidence (i.e., who are beneficiaries) and effects of two environment-
related tax incentives practiced in China since 2008. One is tax credit for investment on
equipment for environmental protection. The other is deduction for taxable incomes from
projects related to environmental protection.
After more than 30 years of extraordinarily rapid economic growth, China is facing
severe environmental degradation. The combustion of fossil fuels (mainly coal) and
many industrial processes release large amounts of air, water, and solid pollutants.
China is now one of the world’s largest emitters of sulfur dioxide (Huang et al. 2010).
Major rivers are organically polluted, while major lakes are also severely polluted by
total nitrogen and phosphorus. Additionally, air pollution causes dust haze across the
country, especially in North China where the country’s main region of coal production
and consumption is. It has even caused concerns in neighboring countries such as
South Korea (Jia and Ku 2016).
As a developing country, China is trying to improve environmental quality while
simultaneously promoting economic growth. Like other nations such as the USA and
India, tax policies play a role in the Chinese government’s efforts to protect the environ-
ment. China initiated two environment-friendly tax incentives in the 2007’s Amendment
of China’s Corporate Income Tax Law. They are investment tax credit (ITC) and taxable
income deduction (TID), both of which are directly associated with pollution alleviating
or energy saving. It is still an open question, however, whether or not these policies have
achieved their purposes.
To that end, we construct a comprehensive and unique taxpayer-level1 dataset over
2007–2011 mainly from the National Tax Statistics Dataset of China (NTSD), comple-
mented by related data at the industry or region level. NTSD includes rich firm-level
information, like beneficiary and tax break2 of ITC or TID, as well as firms’ basic
characteristics and performance. These firms come from different sectors, including
manufacturing, agricultural, building, mining, and services. We focus on manufacturing
firms for they are the main producers of pollutants. This paper’s main sample is a balanced
panel consisting 43,000 observations from manufacturing firms in the key polluting
industries. The rich data aforementioned avoid the problems or challenges in empirical
analysis, such as self-selection in the sample, measurement error of tax incentives, or
omitted variable bias.
The empirical strategies underlying our research are the Probit model and the
method suggested by Greenstone (2002). We use the former model to figure out who
are beneficiaries of the tax incentives and use the latter to check their effects on firms’
activities.3 We find that both incentives are generally not popular. The average probability
of being a beneficiary is below 1 % over 2009–2011, the years just after the ITC and TID
are in practice. State-owned enterprises (SOEs), however, are more likely to benefit from
them. In addition, regional characteristics like local economic and fiscal conditions have
no impact on spread of the tax incentives. We then investigate the reason why these
incentives are not well welcomed by firms. We find that the incentives are negatively
correlated with firm’s profitability, which suggests that environmental investment may
hurt its capacity of earning profits.
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Furthermore, the effects of the tax incentives on taxpayers’ activities, including capital
accumulation, employment, and production, are not remarkable. On average, the incentives
even increase coal consumption. The findings are robust to multiple specifications of the
empirical model. We find that, however, one of the incentives, ITC, does serve the purpose
to protecting environment by restraining coal consumption in specific group of firms which
are affiliated to the central government. We build a theoretical model to explain this finding,
that is, the government’s executive power of taxation plays an important role in effects of
tax incentives on environmental protection. As our empirical results indicate, this executive
power in China mainly depends on the relationship or connection between firms and the
central government. It also relates to the fact found by the literature (Greenstone and
Hanna 2014) that local support can boost efficiency of tax incentives for environmen-
tal protection.
This paper is closely related to a large body of literature about tax incentives. Hall
and Jorgenson (1967) present a model of user cost. They point out that the user cost of
investment is a function of factors including interest rate, relative price and depreciation
rate of investment goods, and tax treatment of capital income. Thus, if a tax policy such as
ITC can reduce user cost, it will then encourage investment. Some researches (Abel 1982;
Sen and Turnovsky 1990; Auerbach and Hassett 1991; Nielsen and Sorensen 1991; Meyer
et al. 1993) find evidences supporting Hall and Jorgenson’s model. In a general equilibrium
model, Bovenberg and Goulder (1993) further find that for the domestic welfare, ITC
should be favored over cuts in the corporate tax rate. Goolsbee (1998), however, provides a
different story. Using a model based on Poterba (1984), he concludes that ITC only causes
sharp increases in prices of investment goods, but the investment itself is relatively
inelastic, which implies that main benefits from ITC go to capital suppliers through
higher prices but rather to investing firms. More alarmingly, Murray et al. (2014) find
$10 billion per year of tax incentives, including production and investment tax credits
for renewable electricity as well as tax credits for production and use of biofuels, have a
tiny impact on greenhouse gas emissions, and may increase emissions in some cases.
Some papers complicate the debate on the relationship between ITC and investment.
Hassett and Metcalf (1999) consider whether the uncertainty of changes in ITC influence
the level of investment and find that policy uncertainty in the form of a fluctuating ITC
may not reduce capital formation. Chirinko and Wilson (2008) are concerned with spill-
overs of ITC and find that a state’s capital formation decreases with the user cost prevailing
in the state but increases with those in competitive states, implying that ITC may be a
zero-sum game among decentralized regions. Assibey-Yeboah and Mohsin (2011)
concern macroeconomic effects of ITC, and they find that, in a developing economy
who is small and open, and with external debt and sovereign risk, ITC may stimulate
aggregate consumption, capital accumulation, foreign debt and output in the long
run, while employment exhibits only transitional dynamics and no long-run change.
This line of literature also gives great attention to the difference between temporary
and permanent ITC. Sen and Turnovsky (1990) argue that a permanent ITC should
lead to a higher equilibrium capital stock, higher employment, and larger output, and a
temporary ITC may have opposite effects. House and Shapiro (2008) disagree the argument
above, however. Using a tax policy of bonus depreciation as external shock, House and
Shapiro estimate the investment supply elasticity, and find that with a temporary ITC,
investment in qualified capital increases sharply. Altug et al. (2009)’s conclusion is
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quite distinctive. They find that a temporary or low policy-persistence ITC generally
increases variability of investment both in the short run and in the long run, which
means that a temporary ITC is not always related to higher level of investment but
always leads to more volatile investment.
Some papers study other aspects of ITC’s economic influence. Lyon (1989) de-
velops a model showing that ITC should have a theoretically ambiguous effect on
firm value, and his empirical tests find the changes in firm value are positively re-
lated to the expected receipt of ITC. Meyer et al. (1993) talk over how to design
an ITC that can not only preserve as much of its long-run advantage but also lose
the least possible federal revenue. Agrawal et al. (2014) find that small Canadian
firms are quite sensitive to R&D tax credits. Huang (2014) demonstrates that tax credits
used by Taiwanese firms have enhanced their productivity, especially for electronics busi-
ness. Roach (2015) considers the role of market regulation, and finds that regions with
deregulated electricity markets response more zealously to tax incentives than their regu-
lated counterparts.
Another line of literature this paper is linked to is study on the effects of environment-
related policy or regulation, especially those about tax policy. Hassett and Metcalf (1995)
suggest that the energy tax credit is statistically significant in explaining the probability of
investing, i.e., increasing the federal credit by 10 percentage points will increase the per-
centage of households claiming for the conservation investment credit from 5.7 to 7.1 %.
Greenstone (2002)’s momentous work examines the impacts of a certain environment
regulation implemented by the USA since the 1970s on growth of employment, capital
stock, and shipments across different regions, providing a panorama of actual economic
effects caused by the regulation. He finds that nonattainment counties who are strictly
regulated lose more jobs, capital stock and output, compared to attainment ones, and the
finding is robust to many specifications and subsamples of polluting industries. Bovenberg
et al. (2008) argue that the relative advantages of the command-and-control policies and
emissions taxes (like fuel taxes) depend on the extent of required abatement or compen-
sation paid by the government to polluters. Metcalf (2010) finds that wind investment is
strongly responsive to changes in tax policy like the federal production tax credit.
Our paper contributes to the above literature from four aspects as below. First, we
establish a simple model to theoretically identify the effect of tax incentives such as
ITC and TID on energy conservation, which has not been carefully discussed in the
literature whose main attentions have been paid to the effect on investment or employment.
Although it is only schematic, the model has realistic basis for related assumptions
and definitely shows the conditions under which the tax incentives can slow down
energy consumption.
Second, we construct a comprehensive and unique micro-level data file, to avoid the
problems or challenges faced by the literature, like self-selection of sample, measure-
ment error of tax incentives, or omitted variable bias. We merge data from various
sources into a dataset to identify incidence and effects of the environment-related tax
incentives in China. They include taxpayer-level information about beneficiary and tax
break of ITC or TID, as well as industry-level and regional data.
Third, we adopt the empirical strategy used by Greenstone (2002) to accurately identify
effects of the tax incentives. As well known, a firm or individual’s response to a tax policy
is usually endogenously related to its or her activities. Greenstone’s method uses
Mao and Wang China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:14 Page 4 of 30
information of pretreatment as key explanatory variables, removing potential circular
causality in estimation. More importantly, as suggested by Greenstone, using weighted
growth of dependent variables helps us control the bias caused by structural changes in
the sample, like birth and death of firms or merger and acquisition among firms.
Lastly, the paper complements the literature with new and more comprehensive
evidence from a developing country. It investigates both who benefit from the tax
policies and what effects of these incentives on firms’ activities are. The former issue
is usually ignored by the literature, while the latter is studied with data mainly from
developed countries. We first pin down factors determining the incidence of ITC and
TID and then discuss mechanisms behind. As to their impacts, we regard capital
accumulation, employment, energy consumption, and production.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section “Institutional background
and theoretical discussion” introduces the institutional background about the tax
incentives implemented by the Chinese government since the year 2008, and theoretically
discusses their impact on energy consumption. Section “Data” describes our data. Section
“Who are beneficiaries: empirical strategy and results” studies the incidence of them, as
well as the related mechanism behind. Section “Effects of the tax incentives: empirical
strategy and results” explores their effects on activities of taxpayers and discusses the key
findings. The last section concludes the paper.
Background
To stimulate local governments to promote economic development, China’s central
government adopted the FCS (fiscal contract system or cai zheng bao gan in Chinese)
soon after the reform and opening up in the late 1970s. A decade-long history of uni-
fied state control over fiscal revenues and expenditures (tongshou tongzhi in Chinese)
since the 1960s resulted in weak fiscal capacity of local governments, which limited the
role they could play in local economic growth. Regarding the huge success of house-
hold contract responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi in Chinese) in
rural areas, the central government made a decision to graft the experience of reform
in rural to fiscal system, allowing subnational governments, including provinces, prefec-
tures, and counties, to reserve the rest of local tax revenues after handing in a certain
amount of funds to the central government (Jin et al. 2005). Under the FCS, both of
firms and local governments benefited in that they were given the right to negotiate
with the central government on how much they should turn in, instead of handing all
profits to the central government under the old system of unified state control over fis-
cal revenues and expenditures. However, tax resources were often hidden by local gov-
ernments, and the central government gradually lost its fiscal capacity (Zhang and Zou
1998; Qiao et al. 2008).
To avoid fiscal crisis and regain its authority in regulating economic and social
development, the central government started an important tax reform in 1994, the
tax-sharing reform (fen shui zhi in Chinese). Thousands of national tax bureaus
were established to take charge of main taxes such as value-added tax and corporate
income tax. Meanwhile, it became the sole tax legislative authority, laying down the
laws or provisional regulations for all types of taxes.
Centralization of fiscal capacity and taxation legislation helps the central government
manage to play a key role in China’s economic growth during the last decades (Yang and
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Yang 2012). At the same time, however, it sacrifices discretion of local governments and
imposes fiscal pressure on them (Jia et al. 2014). To motivate locals to develop economy or
fulfill the tasks assigned by the central government, hundreds of tax preferences are given
to different regions or firms. For instance, before 2008, to attract foreign direct investments,
foreign companies as well as those funded by sources from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan
(HMT) were once allowed to pay income taxes at a lower rate than that for domestic firms.
It causes great distortion in investors’ behaviors (An 2012).
In March 2007, China enacted the Amendment of Enterprise Income Tax Law of the
People’s Republic of China, which tried to unify the tax system for foreign and domestic
enterprises. Most of the existing tax preferences would expire after a 5-year transition
period, and some general or indiscriminative new tax policies were put into effect.
Among them, there are two tax incentives related to pollution alleviating and energy
saving. They are recorded in Paragraph 3, Article 27 and Article 34, respectively. It is
the first time during the last decades for the Chinese government to protect environment
through formal and explicit tax legislation.4
One of them is tax credit for investment on equipment for environmental protection
or ITC. The law allows that 10 % of investment in specific equipment used for reducing
pollution emissions or saving energy can be credited for corporate income tax. The
other is deduction for taxable incomes from the projects related to environmental
protection or TID. The projects include those for public wastewater treatment, public
waste disposal, development and utilization of biogas, technical transformation for
energy conservation and emissions reduction, and sea water desalinization.
Both incentives have been effective since January 1, 2008, and there is no deadline for
expiration. Thus, we can consider them as permanent tax incentives, which are usually
found by the literature to have strong impacts on economic activities. Their impacts on
energy consumption, however, have not been fully examined. We develop a simple
economic model in Additional file 1. It shows that, they may restrain energy consumption
when the government has great executive strength of the tax incentives.5 If that is the
case, ITC or TID should have positive impact on environmental protection for some
group of firms like central enterprises that are closely tied with the central government.
Besides, other things may also have influence. One is local support. Goals like
environmental protection are usually ignored or perfunctorily treated by local firms
or governments in China, who put profits or economic growth first. Jia (2012) finds
some supporting evidences. ITC and TID may be also in the list, since they are made
by the central government, but not by locals. The other is environment-related public
services. They are usually more effective than those provided by the private sector, for the
former can treat externality better (Agrawal et al. 2015). Lack of these services may
weaken incentives for firms to respond to the tax incentives.6
Data
We draw data from three sources. The first one is annual waves of the NTSD, jointly
collected by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and the Ministry of Finance
(MOF). Since 2007, the size of the sample is increased to raise representativeness of the
data, and the sampling methods7 and major variables are kept consistent over time. We
use the data over 2007–2011 from the NTSD, a period just before and after implemen-
tation of ITC and TID.8
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The representativeness of the data is discussed as below. On the one hand, as shown
in Additional file 2: Table S1, the NTSD represents about 64 % of total output, 68 % of
total value added, 62 % of total tax revenues, and 30 % of total urban employment, of
the whole nation. The representativeness is fairly stable over time. On the other hand
and more importantly, the NTSD covers firms from all sectors and regions in China
and includes various categories of economic entities. The dataset includes 906 of totally
913 four-digit industries,9 which belong to 95 two-digit sectors (there are totally 95
two-digit sectors). Among observations from these industries, 43.97 % belong to the
manufacturing sector, 48.84 % belong to the service sector, and the rest belong to the
agricultural, mining, and building sectors. Firms in the NTSD come from 31 provinces
and 333 prefectures, not missing any region across the country. Furthermore, our
sample consists of small, medium, and large firms. Twenty-five percent of the firms in
the dataset employed no more than 10 employees, while 8.97 % had sales not exceeding
5 million Yuan a year, which is a remarkable merit compared to other datasets like the
Chinese Industrial Enterprises Dataset that only includes above-scale manufacturing
firms. Composition of ownership is also multiple, including SOEs (i.e., state-owned en-
terprises), foreign enterprises, HMT enterprises (i.e., owned by funds from Hong Kong,
Macau, or Taiwan), incorporated companies, private firms, and other firms such as
collective-owned or self-employment. Therefore, the NTSD nicely mirrors dynamic of
the economy across industries and regions in China.
For later empirical investigations, we rely on the NTSD for information about the tax
incentives and firm’s activities. Key variables include location where a firm operates,
industry that it belongs to, ITCdummy (dummy for ITC), TIDdummy (dummy for
TID), ITCterm (tax break brought by ITC),10 TIDterm (tax break brought by TID),
ownership, age, employment size, wage, investment, capital stock, consumption of coal
and fuel, return on assets (ROA), and (producing) capacity.11 Some industry-level infor-
mation in the data is also used to measure industry average wage and industry agglom-
eration. These variables are thought as important factors in evaluating effects of
environmental regulation or policies (Goolsbee 1998; Greenstone 2002; House and Sha-
piro 2008).
Before applying the data for estimations, we do some data cleaning. First, we unify
the industry classification standard before and after the year 2011.12 Second, we unify
the area codes for counties, which are changing over time, to the 2007 standard code.13
Third, we drop observations with zero employee, negative total assets, negative net
amount of fixed assets, or negative output. Fourth, we treat14 outliers of the main variables,
including ROA, wage, capital stock, investment, coal input, and fuel input.
The second data source is for variables of environment regulation. The central
government writes targets in the Five-Year Plans for environmental protection, and
specific plans for prevention and control of major pollutants are laid out. The plans
identify key regions and key polluting industries mainly for regulating sulfur dioxide
(SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD). The information for key regions is from
official documents (Huang et al. 2010).15 For key polluting industries, we use infor-
mation from the Handbook on Emission Coefficients of Industrial Sources of Pollu-
tion for the First National Census on Pollution Sources.16
The third set of data reflects region-level characteristics, extracted from administrative
statistics such as China Statistical Yearbook, China City Statistical Yearbook, and China
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Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy. They include provincial GDP deflators, price
index of investment in fixed assets, and producer price index for two-digit industries, which
are used to calculate real values of GDP, investment, and output. We also collect data on
GDP per capita, fiscal deficit, proportion of working population, financial development, and
level of industrialization in a city or county. These regional characteristics are usually con-
trolled by the literature (see, e.g., Chirinko and Wilson 2008; Agrawal et al. 2014).
Using information of location and four-digit industry a firm belongs to, we merge data
from the three sources into one dataset. Summary statistics for main variables are pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2. As Table 1 shows, either ITC or TID is small in amount, and it















Full sample 495,229 689.734 718 0.273 0.550
Key regions 332,516 592.720 561 0.271 0.570
Polluting
industries
269,481 1024.643 263 0.716 0.468
2010
Full sample 860,622 988.085 871 0.299 0.540
Key regions 614,566 969.347 634 0.280 0.557
Polluting
industries
354,269 1150.224 308 0.821 0.474
2011
Full sample 2,494,044 2749.773 907 0.313 0.550
Key regions 2,074,580 3206.461 647 0.286 0.564
Polluting
industries
609,506 1852.602 329 0.950 0.494
TID
2009
Full sample 468,559 4004.778 117 0.045 0.570
Key regions 350,530 3851.978 91 0.044 0.590
Polluting
industries
28,816 1600.889 18 0.049 0.489
2010
Full sample 475,525 4135.000 115 0.040 0.549
Key regions 378,926 4457.953 85 0.038 0.566
Polluting
industries
96,013 3840.520 25 0.067 0.483
2011
Full sample 1,523,733 11,904.160 128 0.044 0.555
Key regions 1,349,565 14,830.380 91 0.040 0.570
Polluting
industries
237,855 8809.444 27 0.078 0.498
Notes: Units of total amount and average amount are both 1000 Chinese renminbi. The probability of being a beneficiary
in the table is related to ITCdummy or TIDdummy in subsequent regressions, whereas tax break equals to ITCterm or
TIDterm. Full sample covers all manufacturing firms in the NTSD, while key regions and polluting industries are its
subsamples, referring to manufacturing firms in the key regions or in the key polluting industries, respectively
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Table 2 Summary statistics of other variables over 2009–2011
Full sample Benchmark sample
Definition Obs. Mean Std. Min Max Obs. Mean Std.
Panel A: taxpayer-level characteristics
SOE Indicator for state-owned firm (0 if not SOE, 1 otherwise) 947,821 0.0358 0.1859 0 1 42,919 0.0350 0.1839
Foreign Indicator for foreign firm (0 if not foreign, 1 otherwise) 947,821 0.1148 0.3188 0 1 42,919 0.0819 0.2742
HMT Indicator for Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan firm (0 if not HMT,
1 otherwise)
947,821 0.0746 0.2627 0 1 42,919 0.0504 0.2188
Lshare Indicator for incorporated firm (0 if not incorporated,
1 otherwise)
947,821 0.0243 0.1541 0 1 42,919 0.0530 0.2240
Private Indicator for private firm (0 if not private, 1 otherwise) 947,821 0.3618 0.4805 0 1 429,19 0.3036 0.4598
ODomestic Indicator for other domestic taxpayer (0 if not other domestic,
1 otherwise)
947,821 0.3886 0.4874 0 1 42,919 0.4761 0.4994
age Age 947,497 9.2350 5.9772 1 112 42,901 10.8304 5.7053
size Number of employees 946,459 184.5121 1095.4260 1 587,430 42,904 410.9350 1734.4920
Investment Newly increased fixed assets/output 758,512 0.0636 0.1774 0 1.4138 36960 0.0640 0.1775
capital Net value of fixed assets/output 803,062 0.6885 1.5961 0 11.9473 38,408 0.7119 1.6044
ROA Net profits/assets 934,124 0.0067 0.1080 −0.5241 0.3853 42,717 0.0049 0.1037
wage Total wages/output 805,700 0.2033 0.4235 0.0096 3.1505 38,594 0.1540 0.4104
capacity Inventory/output 801,548 0.5038 1.4678 0 11.3958 38,484 0.5194 1.5035
import Imports/output 947,827 0.0041 0.0398 0 0.6557 42,919 0.0027 0.0326
netinvest_g 1-period weighted growth of net investment 422,245 0.0083 1.6286 −2 2 19,363 0.0822 1.5412
netcapital_g 1-period weighted growth of net capital 561,613 −0.0331 0.9916 −2 2 24,516 −0.0178 0.5439
employ_g 1-period weighted growth of employees 944,106 −0.0407 0.7004 −1.9999 2 42,873 −0.0236 0.3807
coalinput_g 1-period weighted growth of coal consumption 281,669 −0.1601 1.5587 −2 2 24,456 −0.1536 1.2467
fuelinput_g 1-period weighted growth of fuel consumption 417,330 −0.1042 1.5960 −2 2 22,752 −0.1385 1.4508

















Table 2 Summary statistics of other variables over 2009–2011 (Continued)
valueadd_g 1-period weighted growth of real value added 676,813 −0.0454 1.4050 −2 2 33,006 0.0087 1.2426
Panel B: industry-level characteristics
laborc_ind County-industry average ratio of total wages to output 934,297 0.2043 0.2154 0.0010 3.1505 42,474 0.1631 0.2232
lnagglom Natural logarithm of county-industry total employees
excluding those in the taxpayer
895,932 7.6136 1.9994 0 13.8018 40,265 7.2046 1.7107
Panel C: region-level characteristics
lnrealgdppc Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita 892,501 10.2379 1.1724 6.6581 13.0234 41,440 9.7661 1.0800
fiscalauto (Public spending-fiscal revenue)/public spending 892,882 0.3691 0.2875 −4.1491 1.0825 41,464 0.4843 0.2652
workingpop Urban and rural employees/population 839,868 0.5652 0.4075 0.0297 4.0705 39,601 0.4636 0.1947
finance Loan balance of financial institutions/GDP 891,966 1.4822 0.8476 0.0107 15.6464 41,400 1.2540 0.8464
indlevel Value added of the second industry/GDP 891,772 0.4864 0.1609 0.0003 0.9906 41,348 0.5060 0.1637
Notes: All variables are real values, not affected by price or inflation. Units of output and GDP are 1000 Chinese renminbi and 1 Chinese renminbi, respectively. Units of coal and fuel are ton. Net investment is
calculated as (newly increased fixed assets − ITC-related investment)/output, whereas net capital stock is (net value of fixed assets − net value of ITC-related investment)/output. The benchmark sample consists of in-

















is not highly likely for a firm to be a beneficiary. For the full sample (all manufacturing
firms in the NTSD), total amount of ITC increases from 495 million in 2009 to 2494 mil-
lion Chinese renminbi (RMB) in 2011.17 The amount of TID is relatively smaller. So our
subsequent empirical analysis is mainly focused on ITC.
Average amount of tax preferences received by the beneficiaries, however, are not
negligible for them, which leads to remarkable tax breaks. For instance, in 2011, aver-
age amount of ITC among beneficiaries in the full sample is about 2.75 million Chinese
renminbi. The amount of TID is 11.90 million renminbi.18 As a result, average tax
breaks among beneficiaries are close to 0.55, indicating that nearly half of tax burden
born by a beneficiary has been offset by ITC or TID.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for other variables. We choose incumbents or existing
manufacturing firms over 2007–2011 in the key polluting industries as benchmark sample,
while use the full sample as reference. The reasons for it are as follows. First, some firms
may respond to the tax policies through entry to or exit of the market, causing self-
selection bias to estimation. It is solved by using a strictly balanced panel of incumbents.
Second, firms in the key polluting industries are the main producers of pollutants and thus
main beneficiaries of ITC and TID,19 so we can drop irrelevant observations. After treating
outliers and dropping observations with missing values, there are about 43,000 observations
in the benchmark sample.20
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes firm-level characteristics. The difference between
the full and benchmark sample is not large. As for ownership, about 3.5 % of tax-
payers are SOEs, while less than 20 % are foreign or HMT firms. A large part in the
sample is other domestic firms, such as private-owned, collective, or cooperative ones.
On average, the firms are about 9–10 years old and have 185–411 employees. Invest-
ment is 6 % of the output, while the net value of capital stock is about 70 % of the
output. One-period weighted growth of net investment is 8 % annually in the bench-
mark sample, while net capital stock21 slightly shrinks in both the full sample and
benchmark sample. Growth of employment or energy consumption also declines in
the two samples over time.22
Panel B presents summary statistics for industry-level variables, and there seems
no systematic gap between the two samples. Panel C reports summary statistics of
regional characteristics. Real GDP per capita is close to 20,000 Chinese renminbi
(about 3000 USD). On average, local governments in China have no fiscal auton-
omy, indicated by the fact that public spending is 37 to 48 % larger than fiscal
revenues.23
Method and Result A - Who are beneficiaries
We estimate a Probit model to understand the determinants for incidence of ITC or
TID. The econometric equation is as follows.




jtγ þ υt þ μpt þ εit ; ð1Þ
where (Policydummy) is dummy for ITC or TID. It equals one if the firm is a bene-
ficiary of ITC (or TID). (X) and (Z) are vectors of firm-level and region-level charac-
teristics,24 and (β) and (γ) are their coefficients. Subscripts i, j, and t refer to firm,
region, and year. We also control year fixed effects and province-year trends,25 i.e.,
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(υt) and (μpt), respectively. (α) is constant term, while (ε) is random error. To
account for endogeneity, we use one-period lagged values of firm-level characteris-
tics, (Xi,t − 1).
We try three sets of samples as follows. (1) The benchmark sample. (2) Incumbents
in the polluting industries without those who have investment related to ITC or income
required for TID in the last year but have no such investment or income in the current
year or subsamples A and C of the benchmark sample. (3) Incumbents in the polluting
industries without those who have investment related to ITC or income required for
TID in the last 2 years but have no such investment or income in the current year or
subsamples B and D of the benchmark sample.26
Who are ITC beneficiaries?
Table 3 presents the results about incidence of ITC by estimating Eq. (1), using
the different samples aforementioned. Columns 1, 3, and 5 control province-year
trends, while industry-year trends are controlled in the other columns.
Since the results from different samples are quite similar, we look at those
using the benchmark sample, as reported by columns 1 and 2. They show that
several firm characteristics have significant impacts on the probability of being an
ITC beneficiary. First, ownership does matter. Compared to SOEs, private enter-
prises (indicated by lagPrivate) are less likely to benefit from ITC. Incorporated
enterprises (indicated by lagLshare) seem to express more positive attitude to
ITC than SOEs, but the difference between them is not significant. This finding
is consistent with the literature (see, e.g., Greenstone and Hanna 2014) that
emphasize the importance of local support for good performance of government
regulations on environment. In China, SOEs are tightly connected with the gov-
ernment, in terms of both personnel and finance. It is therefore more likely for
SOEs to reduce pollution and save energy, as a response to the request from the
government.27 As to incorporated enterprises, some of them are listed in stock
markets, who are responsible for both shareholders and the public. They may
trade off between profits required by current investors and environmental protec-
tion favored by the public or potential investors.
Second, factors like age, size and profitability also have remarkable influence. Older
firms, who may be relatively conservative in operation, seem to be more reluctant to
apply for ITC. Taxpayers with more employees or larger capital stock are more likely to
be beneficiaries.28 Meanwhile, taxpayers of stronger profitability are also more likely to
be beneficiaries.29
Third, parameters of coal inputs are positive and significant, while those of fuel
inputs are negative but not significant. It indicates that a firm who performs worse in
alleviating pollution may be more likely to be a beneficiary.
Lastly, it is beyond our expectation that the impacts from regional characteristics
such as real GDP per capita and fiscal autonomy are not significant or not robust. It
indicates that a better economic or fiscal condition does not encourage more taxpayers
to use ITC. With guide of the literature (Agrawal et al. 2015), it is not a surprise given
that China is lack of environment-related public services from local governments, who
occupy numerous economic resources (Xu 2011).
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Table 3 Factors determining probability of being ITC beneficiary
Dependent variable: ITCdummy Benchmark sample Subsample A of benchmark sample Subsample B of benchmark sample
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ownership
lagForeign −0.101 (0.176) −0.151 (0.172) −0.117 (0.177) −0.168 (0.173) −0.122 (0.177) −0.174 (0.173)
lagHMT −0.188 (0.183) −0.210 (0.180) −0.201 (0.184) −0.218 (0.181) −0.206 (0.184) −0.223 (0.182)
lagLshare 0.098 (0.158) 0.084 (0.156) 0.091 (0.159) 0.079 (0.157) 0.089 (0.159) 0.075 (0.157)
lagPrivate −0.353** (0.160) −0.331** (0.159) −0.371** (0.161) −0.345** (0.160) −0.378** (0.161) −0.350** (0.160)
lagODomestic −0.039 (0.144) −0.078 (0.143) −0.053 (0.144) −0.088 (0.144) −0.058 (0.144) −0.092 (0.144)
Taxpayer’s other features
laglnage −0.113* (0.059) −0.168*** (0.060) −0.116** (0.059) −0.171*** (0.060) −0.117** (0.059) −0.171*** (0.060)
laglnsize 0.373*** (0.027) 0.399*** (0.030) 0.379*** (0.027) 0.405*** (0.030) 0.382*** (0.027) 0.408*** (0.030)
lagcapital 0.063*** (0.021) 0.055*** (0.020) 0.061*** (0.021) 0.054*** (0.020) 0.060*** (0.021) 0.053*** (0.020)
lagROA 3.027*** (0.333) 2.863*** (0.339) 3.074*** (0.335) 2.910*** (0.341) 3.084*** (0.335) 2.919*** (0.342)
lagwage −0.096 (0.104) −0.098 (0.100) −0.098 (0.105) −0.101 (0.101) −0.095 (0.105) −0.099 (0.101)
laglncoalinput 0.042*** (0.014) 0.022* (0.013) 0.043*** (0.015) 0.023* (0.014) 0.042*** (0.015) 0.023* (0.014)
laglnfuelinput −0.006 (0.015) −0.012 (0.014) −0.005 (0.015) −0.012 (0.014) −0.005 (0.015) −0.012 (0.014)
Region’s features
lnrealgdppc −0.015 (0.059) −0.031 (0.048) −0.014 (0.060) −0.028 (0.048) −0.013 (0.060) −0.028 (0.048)
fiscalauto −0.072 (0.252) −0.353* (0.190) −0.078 (0.256) −0.343* (0.193) −0.082 (0.257) −0.348* (0.193)
workingpop 0.284 (0.227) 0.291* (0.177) 0.288 (0.228) 0.301* (0.176) 0.282 (0.228) 0.300* (0.176)
finance 0.030 (0.050) 0.036 (0.037) 0.032 (0.051) 0.040 (0.037) 0.031 (0.052) 0.040 (0.038)
indlevel −0.235 (0.214) −0.202 (0.136) −0.271 (0.244) −0.221 (0.147) −0.283 (0.255) −0.231 (0.155)
Constant −4.082*** (0.781) −3.445*** (0.920) −4.088*** (0.789) −3.523*** (0.927) −4.094*** (0.791) −3.559*** (0.929)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

















Table 3 Factors determining probability of being ITC beneficiary (Continued)
Province-year fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No
Industry fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry-year fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observation 11644 11664 11563 11580 11532 11548
Pseudo R-square 0.234 0.208 0.238 0.213 0.240 0.214
Notes: Superscript symbols “*, **, and ***” represent 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % significant level respectively. The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Wald χ2’s p values are all below 0.01. Subsample A of the
benchmark sample consists of incumbents in the polluting industries without those who have investment related to ITC in the last year but have no such investment in the current year. Subsample B of the benchmark sample

















Who are TID beneficiaries?
Additional file 2: Table S2 reports the results about incidence of TID using the
same data and specifications as those in Table 3 for ITC. Because there are more
missing values in TID, the sample becomes smaller in this case.30 Some coeffi-
cients that are significant in Table 3 become insignificant here. They include
those for capital stock, ROA, and coal inputs. The parameters of age become
positive but are neither very significant nor robust.31 The impact of ownership is
statistically significant at higher level, suggesting that all firms but SOEs are less
possible to benefit from TID. Economic and fiscal conditions still have no influ-
ence on incidence of TID.
Robustness checks
We try some sensitivity tests as follows: (1) using two different samples, i.e., in-
cumbents in the key regions and incumbents in the full sample and (2) control-
ling different sets of variables, such as using dummies for age and size instead of
log of them, dropping some of regional characteristics correlated to others.32 We
find that the coefficients of interest are similar. In sum, these findings confirm
that factors such as ownership and scale play important role in spread of ITC
and TID, while regional characteristics are not relevant.33
Discussion on mechanisms behind unpopularity of ITC and TID
As mentioned earlier, there are two factors that may explain unpopularity of the tax
incentives. One is lack of support from taxpayers; the other is short of related public
services from local governments. With regard to Jia (2012), mechanism behind the
second factor is clear. Under a system of official promotion that emphasizes eco-
nomic index, public spending, or budget of the government has been inevitably in-
clined to affairs about economic growth, rather than protecting environment. The
question why firms are poorly responsive, however, remains open.
Our interpretation is that investment or projects related to environmental protection
may hurt profitability of taxpayers. Using the econometric equation mentioned in the
next section, we estimate effect of the tax incentives (as indicators for related investment
or projects) on firm’s ROA. Table 4 reports the results.
As columns 3 and 4 show, once biases caused by structural changes in the sam-
ple are concerned,34 and the errors are clustered at province-industry level,35 we
find that ITC has a significantly negative impact on ROA, especially for the sample
without SOEs. Since non-SOEs like foreign and private domestic enterprises or
even incorporated firms mainly purse maximization of profits rather than social
welfare, they are reluctant to be beneficiaries of the tax policies that may erode
their capacity of making profits.
This finding is consistent with Table 3 and Additional file 2: Table S2, i.e., com-
pared to SOEs who have to consider some social goals, other firms are less likely
to apply for ITC or TID. It gives us an important policy implication about how to
design a tax policy that can efficiently protect environment, that is, it should better
be profit-neutral, bringing no decline of profitability to its beneficiaries.
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Method and Result B - Effects of the tax incentives
In what follows, we use the fixed effects model for panel data to estimate effects of ITC
and TID. Following Greenstone (2002), we estimate the model as below.
ΔY it ¼ Y it−Y i;t−1
 
= Y it þ Y i;t−1
 
=2
  ¼ X 0i;t−1βþ Z
0
jtγ þ αi þ υt þ μpt þ uit ; ð2Þ
where (ΔYit) is identified as weighted growth or percentage change of outcomes we are
interested in between the year t and t − 1. The reason why we introduce this variable
but not ordinary growth rate is that structural changes in the sample may cause bias to
our estimation.36 They include entry and exit of firms or merger and acquisition among
firms. It will lead to huge variation in (ΔYit), while the variation may have no connection
with the policies we study on. It will then cause bias in the results of our estimation,
which may be driven by changes in composition of the sample but not the tax incentives
per se.37 Weighted (ΔYit), with an interval of values limited between minus two and posi-
tive two, can greatly reduce the scale of variation caused by unrecorded changes in the
sample and thus control the bias.38
Table 4 Analysis on mechanism: effect of being beneficiaries of ITC and TID on profitability
Dependent variable: ROA Original value Weighted growth
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Part A: benchmark sample
Lagged ITCdummy −0.008 (0.008) −0.008 (0.008) −0.041 (2.413) −1.384* (0.743)
lagged TIDdummy −0.011 (0.012) −0.010 (0.013) 4.773 (5.487) 2.680 (6.098)
Taxpayer-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Taxpayer fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and province-year fixed effect Yes No Yes No
Industry and industry-year fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Within R-square 0.013 0.010 0.005 0.001
Observation 25003 25003 24814 24814
Part B: benchmark sample without SOEs
Lagged ITCdummy −0.014 (0.009) −0.014 (0.009) −1.472** (0.727) −1.510** (0.663)
Lagged TIDdummy −0.011 (0.015) −0.011 (0.015) 4.869 (6.040) 3.340 (6.372)
Taxpayer-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Taxpayer fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and province-year fixed effect Yes No Yes No
Industry and industry-year fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Within R-square 0.014 0.011 0.002 0.003
Observation 22903 22903 23939 23939
Notes: Superscript symbols "*, **, and ***" represent 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % significant level respectively. The two coefficients
in Italics should be emphasized for they indicate that ITC hurts firms' profitability. In all columns, we use specifications
similar to Eq. (2), and residuals are clustered at province-industry level. In columns 1–2, the dependent variable is ROA,
while that for columns 3–4 is weighted growth of ROA. Taxpayer-level control variables include age and size. We also try
adding other factors like ownership, wage, capacity and import, and industry-level characteristics, and the results are
quite similar. Meanwhile, we try adding region-level variables like real GDP per capita and some others but find that their
coefficients are not significant, and the key results experience no difference. The within R-square is relatively small, for
we have controlled many fixed effects in estimation. For other notes, see Table 3
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(Y) represents firm’s activities including investment, capital stock, employment,
consumption of coal and fuel, output, and value added. (Xi,t − 1) is a vector of
firm-level variables, whose pretreatment values at the last year are used here.39
(Zjt) refers to the industry-level characteristics for the present period, including
county-industry average wage ratio and agglomeration of industry.40 (β) and (γ)
are coefficients of (X) and (Z). (αi) is firm-level fixed effect, while (υt) and (μpt)
are year and province-year fixed effects.41 (uit) is random error, clustered at
province-industry level.
Two points are worth mentioning here. One is that the coefficient of extensive
margin effect should be opposite in sign to that of intensive margin effect.42 The
reason is that (β) of ITCterm or TIDterm is the effect of tax break or one minus tax
incentives43 but not direct impact of tax incentives. For the results of intensive mar-
gin effect therefore, a negative (β) means a positive effect. The other is that (β) or
(γ) should be carefully interpreted, for they are not elasticity or quasi-elasticity
usually presented in the literature.44 We will provide discussions later.
The baseline results
Table 5 reports our baseline results about the effects of ITC and TID on firm’s activities,
using Eq. (2). Model specifications are the same across columns 1, 3, 5 and 7, in which
province-year trends are controlled. Specifications in the other columns are similar, while
industry-year trends are concerned. Other factors like the firm-level and industry-level
characteristics are considered in all of the regressions. There are two parts in Table 5. Part
A presents the extensive margin effects, using ITCdummy and TIDdummy as the key
independents, while part B shows the intensive margin effects by regressing on ITCterm
and TIDterm.
Since the majority of the parameters of interest are not statistically significant, we pro-
vide discussions for part of the results here and leave the rest in the Additional file 2:
Table S3. Main findings are as follows. First, ITC stimulates consumption of coal,
both extensively and intensively. The parameters of lagged ITCdummy are 0.404 and
0.407 when we control different sets of fixed effects, implying elasticities of 0.0064
and 0.0065, respectively. The coefficients of lagged ITCterm are −1.437 and −1.305,
equal to elasticities of 0.0030 and 0.0027 to ITC, respectively. These results indicate
that more ITC firms receive, more coal, though not large in growth according to the
small elasticities above, will be consumed. It can be explained by the mechanism we
discuss in Subsection “Discussion on mechanisms behind unpopularity of ITC and
TID” of Section “Who are beneficiaries: empirical strategy and results”, that is, invest-
ment for protecting environment hurts profitability and firms thus use more coal that
is cheaper45 than other energies like fuel and hydraulic to save costs and keep profits.
Second, the tax incentives restrain to some extent growth of net investment and out-
put. The coefficients, however, are statistically significant at low levels. These results
are consistent with previous studies in the literature (see, e.g., Goolsbee 1998; Greenstone
2002; Altug et al. 2009; Assibey-Yeboah and Mohsin 2011) who find that regulations or
tax policies do no good for expansion of the targeted industries. Third, other effects of the
tax incentives are not remarkable. The parameters of employment, net capital stock, fuel
inputs, and value added are generally insignificant.
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Table 5 Baseline effects of ITC and TID on activities of taxpayers
Dependent variable: weighted growth in Eq. (2) Net investment Employment Coal inputs Output
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Part A
Lagged ITCdummy −0.430* (0.228) −0.410* (0.226) −0.007 (0.026) −0.009 (0.026) 0.404** (0.199) 0.407** (0.204) 0.020 (0.053) 0.034 (0.053)
Lagged TIDdummy 0.215 (0.476) 0.171 (0.516) 0.017 (0.088) 0.031 (0.088) −0.330 (0.442) −0.360 (0.442) −0.162 (0.195) −0.135 (0.200)
Taxpayer-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Taxpayer fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and province-year fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Industry and industry-year fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Within R-square 0.021 0.014 0.546 0.548 0.044 0.038 0.522 0.519
Observation 16584 16584 20907 20907 13821 13821 20810 20810
Part B
lagged ITCterm 0.149 (0.558) 0.114 (0.575) 0.090 (0.069) 0.108 (0.068) −1.437** (0.683) −1.305** (0.636) −0.080 (0.152) −0.073 (0.155)
Lagged TIDterm −0.284 (0.446) −0.273 (0.432) 0.078 (0.132) 0.083 (0.125) 0.911 (0.720) 0.952 (0.743) 0.358* (0.199) 0.344* (0.176)
Taxpayer-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Taxpayer fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

















Table 5 Baseline effects of ITC and TID on activities of taxpayers (Continued)
Industry and industry-year fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Within R-square 0.021 0.014 0.551 0.552 0.044 0.040 0.524 0.522
Observation 15953 15953 20070 20070 13207 13207 19976 19976
Notes: Superscript symbols "*, ** and ***" represent 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % significant level respectively. The coefficients in Italics should be emphasized for they indicate that the tax incentives stimulate coal
consumption. In all columns, we use the specification in Eq. (2), and residuals are clustered at province-industry level. Taxpayer-level control variables include ownership, age, size, ROA, wage, capacity, import, and output, and

















Table 6 Heterogeneity in effects of ITC: regarding taxpayer’s affiliation
Dependent variable: weighted
growth in Eq. (2)
Subsample E of benchmark sample Subsample F of benchmark sample Subsample A of full sample Subsample B of full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent variables Coal inputs Net investment Coal inputs Net investment Coal inputs Coal inputs
Part A
Lagged ITCdummy −7.614** (3.738) −3.951*** (1.220) 1.659** (0.629) 0.099 (0.835) −0.172 (1.223) −0.252 (0.980)
Taxpayer-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Taxpayer fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and province-year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
within R-square 0.795 0.702 0.180 0.174 0.225 0.209
Observation 144 201 3048 3693 799 1198
Part B
Lagged ITCterm 81.460*** (14.892) 2.897*** (1.044) −2.167 (1.433) −2.572* (1.547) 17.988** (7.592) 16.433** (7.901)
Taxpayer-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Taxpayer fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and province-year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-square 0.859 0.925 0.193 0.180 0.109 0.095
Observation 126 178 2998 3645 724 1067
Notes: Superscript symbols "*, **, and ***" represent 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % significant level respectively. The coefficients in Italics should be emphasized for they indicate that ITC constrains coal consumption of firms
affiliated to the central government. Columns 1–2 use subsample E of the benchmark sample or firms attached to the central government in the benchmark sample, while columns 3–4 use subsample F of the
benchmark sample, that is, those attached to subnational governments including provinces, prefectures and counties in the benchmark sample. Column 5 uses subsample A of the full sample, that is, incumbents or
existing firms affiliated to the central government in the full sample. Column 6 uses subsample B of the full sample or firms affiliated to the central government in the full sample. We do not report the results for TID
due to lack of TID-related observations. We try controlling industry and industry-year fixed effects instead of province and province-year ones and find the results are similar to those in this table. We also try estima-

















In sum, the baseline results indicate two findings. One is that economic effects of the tax
incentives are weak in that they only slightly deter investment and output of the beneficiar-
ies. The other and more important is that the incentives increase coal consumption, which
means negative impacts on environmental quality and is contrary to their initial purpose.
Robustness checks
We do several robustness checks for the baseline results. First, we add regional character-
istics in the regression. Second, we use dummies for age and size, instead of logs of them.
The new results are reported in Additional file 2: Table S4.46 They are quite similar to the
baseline results, regarding the impacts of the tax incentives. Third, we try different defini-
tions of the dependent variable, including ordinary growth rate and natural log of it. For
the results, see Additional file 2: Table S5. The parameters become very large in value and
are all insignificant when we use ordinary growth rate. It implies the necessity to follow
Greenstone’s method, for ignoring structural changes in the sample like merger or acqui-
sition will conceal the impact of ITC on coal consumption. When logs of the dependent
variables are used, the results are similar to those in Table 5.
Heterogeneity analyses
First, we check whether the results vary across regions.47 To do this, we classify loca-
tions of firms into three regions: eastern, central, and western.48 We re-estimate the
baseline regressions by using the interactions of region dummies with tax incentives as
main explanatory variables. The interested parameters of the interactions, however, are
not significant.
Second, we try sensitivity tests regarding ownership, size, and region-specific charac-
teristics like fiscal spending for environmental protection, whether a key regulated area
and whether a county of ethnic minorities.49 The regressions include the interactions
of related dummies with tax incentives. None of the above tests show statistically
significant impacts of the tax incentives on firm’s activities.
Third, we use subsamples which consist of only SOEs and (or) incorporated enter-
prises. The parameters of interest, however, are either insignificant or indifferent from
those in Table 5. These firms per se, however, should be cautiously analyzed. As to the
state-owned economy, SOEs are only part of it, while other firms like incorporated
enterprises, collective enterprises, and public-private joint ventures are also affiliated to
different levels of governments.50 For the state-owned economy, therefore, affiliation
may be a better indicator than ownership.
As to those attached to the central government, most of them are central enter-
prises51 (yang qi in Chinese) who are very closely tied to the central government. They
are usually regarded as part of the public sector but not ordinary profit-seeking enter-
prises. Supporting evidence is that senior executives or managers of these enterprises
have administrative rank or title.52 Regarding the model in Additional file 1, the litera-
ture (Greenstone and Hanna 2014), and Subsection “Discussion on mechanisms behind
unpopularity of ITC and TID” of Section Who are beneficiaries: empirical strategy and
results, the tax incentives should have some good impact on these special enterprises.
For one thing, the central government has a stronger executive power of taxation on
them53 and gets more support from them, compared to others like those attached to
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subnational governments. For another, receiving billions of subsidies from the central
government annually,54 these firms care less about profits and may better comply with
the tax policies.
We use subsamples of firms affiliated to the central or subnational governments and
redo the baseline estimations. The results are reported in Table 6. To save space, we re-
port only the results that have significant difference between the subsamples. Columns
1–2 use subsample E of the benchmark sample (i.e., enterprises affiliated to the central
government), while columns 3–4 use subsample F of the benchmark sample (i.e., firms
attached to subnational governments). By enlarging the scale of sample, columns 5–6
are robustness checks for the results in column 1 which are the key finding and are the
basis for our later discussion on policy implications.
We find that signs of the parameters of ITC in columns 1–2 are exactly opposite to those
in columns 3–4, implying that impacts of ITC on enterprises affiliated to the central govern-
ment are systemically different from effects on those attached to subnational governments.
Regarding columns 1 and 2, ITC slows down coal consumption and restrains growth of net
investment. Take the effect on coal consumption as an example. The coefficient for extensive
margin effect is −7.614 or elasticity of −0.5018. It is quite significant. That for intensive margin
effect is 81.460 or elasticity of 1.5093.55 It is very significant and robust. For their counterparts
attached to subnational governments, ITC increases coal consumption and net investment, as
shown in columns 3 and 4. Our theoretical model and the literature are supported by these
results.
Combining the results in Tables 4 and 6, we can confirm a conjecture that close rela-
tionship between firms and the central government enhances the restraining impact of
ITC on coal consumption, while worry for losing profits weakens it.56
Discussion on the results from heterogeneity analyses
First, although the results may suggest that close relationship between firms and the
central government is crucial, it by no means supports that firms creating pollution or
wasting resources should all be nationalized for the sake of environmental protection.
Instead, we should emphasize the importance of information transparency and ad-
equate regulations. On the one hand, without necessary and high-quality information,
it is difficult for tax policies or incentives to be efficient (Pomeranz 2015). Departments
of the central government should do better on collecting and using data about firms’
energy consuming and their efforts on pollution alleviation. With these, the govern-
ment is able to design tax policies that are more incentive compatible or at least profit-
neutral and to better implement them as well. On the other hand, the central govern-
ment who less concerns about profits of a certain firm should take more responsibility
in the practice of the tax incentives.
Second, the results from Subsection “Discussion on the results from heterogeneity
analyses” have important implications, especially for the elasticities (0.5018 and
−1.5093) that we derive from column 1 in Table 6. The benchmark sample indicates
that, on average, a firm consumes 23,907 t of coal annually. If the firms respond to ITC
like those affiliated to the central government, then 1 % of increase in probability of
being beneficiary (or 430 more ITC beneficiaries) would lead to a 120-ton decrease in
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coal consumption for each firm, whereas 1 % of increase in tax incentives (or about
5200 Chinese RMB more ITC for each beneficiary)57 would save 361 tons of coal for
every taxpayer. If the impact could be extended to the whole group of above-scale
manufacturing firms,58 and given that 1 % of them would benefit from ITC, then each
20 million Chinese RMB used for tax incentives could save 1.4 million tons of coal.59
This is a big bang for the buck. So if better designed and implemented, the tax incen-
tives put into practice since 2008 may become one of the ideal tools for environmental
protection in China.
Conclusions
This paper studies both incidence and influence of two tax incentives for protecting
environment in China. Based on a taxpayer-level dataset from various sources, we find
that the incentives are not well welcomed by firms, with the exception of SOEs. In
addition, we find that their effects on firms’ activities are below expectation. They even
increase coal consumption. These findings are robust to multiple specifications of using
different empirical strategies, samples, and explanatory or dependent variables. Further
analyses, however, show that one of the tax incentives, ITC, works well—restraining
growth of coal consumption—in some manufacturers which are affiliated to the central
government. Our theoretical and empirical studies suggest that less negative impact on
profitability and closer firm-government relationship will promote positive impact of
the tax incentives on environmental protection.60
The empirical findings point to policy implications. If well designed and imple-
mented, tax incentives such as ITC may be an efficient tool for saving energy and lim-
iting emissions. A feasible measurement may be setting up a complete system of tax
expenditures management. In developed countries such as the USA, Australia, and
Canada, tax expenditures are important part of public budget, providing detailed
information about incidence and effects of various types of tax incentives or prefer-
ences. With a system of tax expenditures management, we can know better about
how the two tax incentives studies in the paper have been implemented in each firm
and then find ways to promote efficiency of the tax incentives.
Although the dataset used by us is from a single country, China, the situations
documented in this paper, such as lack of local support and poor executive power of
taxation, might befall in other developing countries. So for the governments of these
countries to redesign the institutions related with environmental protection, our
research is also meaningful.
Endnotes
1. “Taxpayer” and “firm” are exchangeable in this paper.
2. Explanation for tax break is as follows. Given that statutory tax rate is t, tax base is
M, and tax incentives are xM (0 < x < 1), we can get that the net-of-incentive tax rate is
(1 − x)t. Tax break refers to (1 − x), similar to the term of net-of-tax rate used by the
literature. In empirical studies, net-of-tax rate is generally used as independent variable,
rather than tax rate or tax burden per se (see, e.g., Feldstein 1995, 1999; Saez 2001;
Fack and Landais 2016). Following the literature, we use tax breaks but not tax incentives
in subsequent estimations. It is unnecessary to consider net-of-tax rate or combine it with
Mao and Wang China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:14 Page 23 of 30
tax break in this paper, for the statutory tax rate of corporate income tax in China keeps
at 25 percent nationwide since 2008.
3. As well known, a firm or individual’s response to a tax policy is usually endogenously
related to its or her activities. Greenstone uses information of pretreatment as key
explanatory variables, removing potential reverse causality in estimation. More
importantly, as suggested by Greenstone (in his NBER Working Paper No. 8484,
which is a complete vision of Greenstone (2002)), using weighted growth of dependent
variables helps us control the bias caused by structural changes in the sample, like birth
(entry) and death (exit) of firms.
4. Before 2008, there were once some temporary tax preferences for comprehen-
sive resource utilization. Meanwhile, charges for disposing pollutants are levied be-
fore and after the 2008’s tax reform. None of these policies, however, are laws, but
provisional regulations or administrative rules. Additionally, there are also some
tax preferences for environmental protection in other taxes like value-added tax,
but their incidence and effects are not yet available for empirical study due to lack
of data. In the estimations below, we consider some variables including fixed ef-
fects to control potential impact from these tax preferences.
5. We build a schematic model, in which we consider a three-factor production
function and two types of tax incentives, i.e., ITC and TID. We then get compara-
tive static effects of these tax incentives on energy consumption. Here, the execu-
tive strength depends on two factors, information transparency and strictness of
the implementation. The former is usually determined by quality of corporate gov-
ernance in firms, while the latter is connected to relationship between firms and
the government. For details of the model and relevant evidences for assumptions
in it, see Additional file 1 and Additional file 2: Table S6.
6. Using the data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, we find that
during 2007–2014, the ratio of public spending used for environmental protection
to total public expenditures is averagely 2.41 %, lower than that for education
(14.89 %), social security (10.37 %), health care (5.40 %), and science and technol-
ogy (4.06 %). The real fiscal spending per capita on environmental protection in
our benchmark sample over 2009–2011 is only 149 Chinese RMB per capita. It is
lower (118.20 Chinese RMB) over 2007–2011. Its distribution is shown by Add-
itional file 2: Figure S1. It is apparently left skewed, implying that most of the tax-
payers in the sample locate in regions with low public spending on environmental
protection.
7. The firms in the NTSD are sampled through two methods. One is direct statistics,
suitable for firms who pay a large amount of taxes. The other is stratified sampling, div-
iding the taxpayers nationwide to deciles according to their sales and then randomly
sampling certain firms from each decile.
8. We mainly use the data over 2009–2011, for the values of ITC and TID are un-
available until 2009. Part of the data over 2007–2008 are also used to create the bench-
mark sample on which our main empirical results depend.
9. Seven four-digit industries that are not involved are all economic-trivial or non-
profit ones, including 0340 (animal hunting), 9032 (archives), 9422 (foreign affairs),
9431 (courts), 9432 (procuratorates), 9520 (political parties), and 9612 (women
federation).
Mao and Wang China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:14 Page 24 of 30
10. According to footnote 3, the value of ITCterm is from zero to one. When it
is close to zero, ITC is very bountiful because the tax credit is nearly equal to in-
come tax payable. TIDterm is alike.
11. We consider the following types of ownership: SOE, private, limited liability or in-
corporated, foreign, HMT, and other domestic company. For definitions of other vari-
ables, see Table 2.
12. We unify the new standard beginning in 2011 to that before 2011. In 2011, the
four-digit industry codes of China were changed. It will certainly result in misidentifica-
tion of industries if not unified.
13. About 670 among nearly 3000 county-level regions in China experience changes
in area code.
14. We use the order winsor in STATA to treat 0.5 % in upper and lower limits
respectively.
15. China’s environmental regulation efforts in recent years mainly focus on these
regions where have been severely polluted. One is the three rivers (Huai, Hai, and
Liao) and three lakes (Tai, Chao, and Dianchi), where COD emissions have caused
severe organic pollution in the rivers and lakes. Another is the two control zones,
which have heavy air pollution by SO2 and acid rain. Related government plans
clearly list the key regions (at county or prefecture level).
16. It allows us to determine whether a four-digit industry can be classified as a key
polluting industry.
17. The extremely quick growth of total amount in the full sample is due to sev-
eral outliers in the year 2011, while growth in the benchmark sample (manufactur-
ing firms from the key polluting industries) is relatively normal and acceptable.
This is one of the reasons why our estimations below are focused on the bench-
mark sample.
18. It should be mentioned that ITC is directly the amount of tax preference,
while the benefit from TID is the number of multiplying TID by statutory tax rate
(25 %). See equation (A2) in Additional file 1, which is helpful to understand the
difference between ITC and TID.
19. Firms from the key polluting industries are more responsive to the incentives,
and they also receive more generous preferences. As Table 1 shows, average prob-
ability of being a beneficiary in the sample of key polluting industries is higher
than that in the full sample. Take ITC for example, in 2011, the possibility of re-
ceiving it is 0.950 % for key polluting industries, obviously higher larger than that
for the full sample (0.313 percent). As far as tax break is concerned, we have simi-
lar finding. ITC and TID are not more generous in key regions, however. One pos-
sible reason is that too many regions are chosen as key regulation areas, resulting
in a fact that regulated regions cannot explicitly target main polluters at micro
level.
20. What is worth mentioning is that it may be more preferred that the benchmark
sample be focused on some concrete industries such as environmental protection,
energy and water saving, and production safety. However, according to the industry
classification codes (i.e., GB/T 4754-2002 or GB/T 4754-2011) issued by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China, we cannot find codes for these kinds of industries and
thus cannot define related firms.
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21. Here, net capital stock is the value after we subtract ITC-related investment from
the net value of fixed assets. Net investment is similar. So the dependent variables in
what follows will not be overlapped with some key independent variables such as ITC-
term, which avoids estimation bias. For explanation for weighted growth, see Section V.
22. It is consistent with the fact that the Chinese economy has been severely shocked
by the 2008’s subprime mortgage crisis.
23. Local governments depend highly on transfers (4.65 trillion Chinese RMB in 2014
or nearly 60 of total local fiscal revenues) from the central government.
24. Firm-level characteristics include ownership, age, size, capital, ROA, wage, inputs
of coal, and fuel, while regional control variables are real GDP per capita, fiscal auton-
omy, working population, finance development, and level of industrialization. For defi-
nitions of these variables, see panels A and C in Table 2.
25. They are used to account for potential effects of factors such as other tax
preferences or cyclic economic fluctuations. We also try industry-year trends in-
stead of province-year ones. As shown by Table 3, the key results using different
sets of fixed effects are similar. We prefer province-year to industry-year, for there
exists large trade barriers among provinces due to the Chinese-style
decentralization (see Young 2000; Xu 2011), and time-varying policies from provin-
cial governments should have greater impact on firms’ activities.
26. The reason why we use these subsamples is that some investment or income
connected to environmental protection may be one-time or lumpy and will not
recur in the following years. For instance, a firm who has purchased some equips
for alleviating pollution in 2009 may not need to continue such investments in
2010 or 2011. If we keep the 2010–2011 observations of this firm in our bench-
mark sample, we may underestimate the possibility of benefiting from ITC or TID.
Subsamples A and B are used in Table 3, while subsamples C and D in Additional
file 2: Table S2.
27. However, what deserves mention is that SOEs per se are heterogeneous. In China,
they belong to different levels of governments, some of which mainly emphasize
economic growth that is essential for promotion, rather than environmental protection
(Jia 2012). Our later estimations verify it.
28. It implies that the view of financial repression (see, e.g., Agrawal et al. 2014)
on environment-related investment may not hold in China. Otherwise, small firms
should respond more actively to ITC, for ITC reduces financial constraints on
them.
29. One explanation is that limiting emissions and saving energy are activities con-
suming profits. So firms with stronger profitability are more capable to involve them-
selves in green investment. It is supported by the evidences from Subsection
“Discussion on mechanisms behind unpopularity of ITC and TID” of Section “Who are
beneficiaries: empirical strategy and results”.
30. The variable lagHMT is dropped in estimations due to lack of related
observations.
31. The parameters of age become insignificant when we control industry-year trends.
Compared to the results in Table 3, it may imply that the effect of age on ITC is differ-
ent from its impact on TID. For two things, however, we do not dwell on it. One is that
it is not our main interest; the other is that the results for TID are not robust.
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32. Details are as follows. Age is divided to three categories, zero-five, six-nine, ten
and older. We use zero-five as reference. Size is divided quarterly according to the dis-
tribution of sizes in same industry, and we use smallest 25 percentage as reference.
Some region-level control variables like financial development and industrial structure
are correlated with real GDP per capita or fiscal autonomy.
33. To save space, we do not report these results in the paper. The results are avail-
able from the authors upon request.
34. Unrecorded behaviors like merger and acquisition between firms will cause bias in
the parameters of interest, and this problem can be lessened by using weighted growth
but not original level of ROA. For related explanation, see Section “Effects of the tax
incentives: empirical strategy and results”.
35. We also try clustering the errors at firm, province, and industry, respectively and
find that the results are very close. With regard to the reason mentioned in Section “Ef-
fects of the tax incentives: empirical strategy and results”, we choose clustering errors
at province-industry level as baseline specification.
36. As our data of ITC and TID cover only 3 years of 2009–2011, we do not try
weighted growth with 2-year gap, in that the dataset will then be cross sectional but
not panel. We try using the ordinary growth rate as defined by (ΔYit = (Yit − Yi,t − 1)/Yi,t
− 1) in robustness checks.
37. Using the benchmark sample ensures that our results will not be bothered by
entry or exit of taxpayers. They may still be biased, however, by merger and acqui-
sition among firms. Since the NTSD provides no information about these activities,
we have reasons to suspect whether an incumbent firm is still the one it was in
the last year or years. For instance, a taxpayer in the benchmark sample, who has
not any change in firm code or name, may in fact have been merged with a firm
never in our sample.
38. It can be thought as an extension of Greenstone’s consideration, in that merger or
acquisition is qualitatively similar to entry or exit, all of which will cause great changes
in activity or performance of a firm. Greenstone (2002) has paid attention to entry and
exit but neglects those like merger and acquisition. Thus, weighted growth of the
dependent variable should still be used here, even in a sample of balanced panel data.
39. Pretreatment values of the key independent variables are believed to be less
endogenously correlated with the dependent variable (Greenstone 2002). We also try
using Xit and find the results are similar. To save space, we do not report them in the
paper. They are available from the authors upon request. For definitions of these vari-
ables, see panel A in Table 2.
40. For definitions of these variables, see panel B in Table 2. We also try adding
region-level variables like real GDP per capita and fiscal autonomy but find that their
coefficients are not significant, and the results of key variables experience no difference.
So, in the baseline specification, we do not control these factors. But, we consider them
in robustness check (see Additional file 2: Table S4).
41. We also try controlling industry-year fixed effects, and as reported by Table 5, the
main results are similar.
42. Here, the extensive and intensive margin effects refer to impact of being a benefi-
ciary and that of the benefits received, respectively.
43. As to the reason for that, see footnote 3.
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44. Since (ΔYit), weighted growth but not log of value or normal annual growth, is used
in Eq. (2), there needs some calculations for shifting (β) or (γ) to elasticity (see Additional
file 3).
45. Coal is one of the cheapest energy in China, which provides over 80 % of the total elec-
tricity power and is the main resource of air pollution (Vennemo et al. 2009; Wang 2011;
Jia 2012).
46. We also try specifications with industry-year fixed effects, as well as estimations on
the other variables of interest, including net capital stock, fuel consumption, and value
added. We find that the results are similar to the baseline.
47. Some of the empirical results mentioned in this subsection are not reported, for al-
most all of them are not significant. They are available from the authors upon request.
48. The eastern includes the following provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning,
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan. The central
covers Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. The west-
ern consists of Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet,
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.
49. According to the information from the National Bureau of Statistics of China,
there are 634 counties of ethnic minorities among nearly 3000 county-level administra-
tive areas. They are relatively autonomous in social and economic development. Thus,
it deserves attention that whether or not firms in these regions behave differently when
they face to the tax incentives.
50. An example is Baosteel Group Corporation, who is located in Shanghai and is one
of Chinese steel giants. Although it is an incorporated enterprise, the power of appoint-
ing chairman of the board is in hand of the central government. For relevant discus-
sions, see Hsieh and Song (forthcoming).
51. In our sample, 85 % of the firms attached to the central government are central
enterprises or SOEs attached to the central government. In the rest, 3 % are incorpo-
rated enterprises and 12 % are other firms.
52. For instance, board chairman of CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation),
who is directly appointed by the central government, is an entrepreneur equal to minis-
ters in administrative hierarchy.
53. For related evidences, see Additional file 2: Table S6.
54. In our sample, the ratio of fiscal subsidies to total sales for SOEs is averagely four
to five times higher than that for other firms.
55. We will discuss policy implications based on these elasticities in Subsection “Dis-
cussion on the results from heterogeneity analyses” of this section.
56. We also try other specification using interactions of ITC with dummies for the
subsamples. The main results are qualitatively close to those in Table 6. Furthermore,
we repeat estimations using subsamples of listed and unlisted firms, and fail to find
significant difference. Those listed as well as affiliated to the central government, how-
ever, response like central enterprises. What does matter, therefore, is the relationship
with the central government, but not being public enterprises. The related results are
available from the authors upon request.
57. A beneficiary in the benchmark sample receives 522,143 Chinese RMB of ITC,
averagely. And we assume that the payable tax will not change when ITC is
increased.
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58. There are 0.38 million firms in China that are above-scale manufacturing
enterprises. See the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, <http://data.
stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01>. The figure is for the year 2014.
59. The figures are those under intensive margin effect. They are calculated by multi-
plying 3800 by 361 and multiplying 3800 by 5221. The figures under extensive margin
effect, however, are less cost-benefit efficient.
60. There may be some other micro-level mechanisms behind the correlation
of tax incentives with environmental protection. Due to availability of data,
however, now we can just give evidence about the mechanisms of profitability and
firm-government relationship. We will continue our study on other mechanisms in
future research.
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